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REPUBLICANS AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Michael T. Morley†
JESSE H. RHODES, BALLOT BLOCKED: THE POLITICAL EROSION OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT (STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP. 280. HARDCOVER
$90.00. PAPERBACK $27.95.

The Voting Rights Act of 19651 is one of the most important federal laws of the
Twentieth Century. It swept away restrictions used throughout the South to disenfranchise
African-Americans,2 tightened federal antidiscrimination provisions concerning voting
rights,3 and authorized federal officials to monitor elections 4 and even register voters5 in
southern states. The Act also imposed preclearance requirements on states with a history
of racial discrimination to prevent them from devising new ways to discriminate.6
Complementing these provisions expanding access to the ballot, the statute simultaneously
enhanced federal protections against fraudulent voter registrations, 7 thereby preventing
legitimately cast ballots from being diluted or nullified by fraudulent ones.8
Until recent Supreme Court rulings revisiting its constitutionality, 9 the Voting
Rights Act had long been regarded as a superstatute, part of the firmament of American
law that helped shape the backdrop against which ordinary legislative and political
† Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on
Law, Harvard Law School, 2012-2014; Yale Law School, J.D., 2003; Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public & International Affairs, A.B., magna cum laude, 2000. The author served as Special Assistant
to the General Counsel of the Army in the Administration of President George W. Bush.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 [hereinafter “VRA”].
2. See, e.g., id. § 4(a), 79 Stat. at 438; cf. id. § 10, 79 Stat. at 442 (authorizing Attorney General to bring
constitutional challenges against poll taxes).
3. Id. §§ 2, 11(a)–(b), 12(a), (c)–(e), 15, 79 Stat. at 437, 443–45; see also id. § 3(b), 79 Stat. at 437.
4. Id. § 8, 79 Stat. at 441.
5. Id. §§ 3(a), 6–7, 9, 79 Stat. at 437, 439–42.
6. VRA § 5, 79 Stat. at 439; see also id. § 3(c), 79 Stat. at 437–38. A jurisdiction subject to preclearance
requirements is prohibited from changing any election-related policies, practices, or procedures unless either the
U.S. Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concludes
the modification will not reduce minority participation in the electoral process. See Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 141 (1975).
7. Id. § 11(c)–(d), 79 Stat. at 443.
8. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 226 (1974) (holding that a person has the constitutional
right to have his or her vote be “given full value and effect, without being diluted or distorted by the casting of
fraudulent [or otherwise ineligible] ballots”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
9. See Shelby Cty v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S
193 (2009).
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decisions were made.10 Within two years of the law’s enactment, a majority of votingage African-Americans were registered to vote in every southern state, 11 primarily as a
result of the Act’s suspension of literacy tests throughout the region and deployment of
federal examiners to register new voters.12 Over the decades that followed, AfricanAmerican participation in the electoral system has come to equal that of whites, 13 the
African-American community has evolved into a cornerstone of the Democratic Party’s
coalition,14 and African-Americans have held office at every level of government
including, of course, the Presidency. 15
Numerous histories have been written specifically about the Voting Rights Act, 16
and it plays an important role in broader histories of voting rights in the United States. 17
Professor Jesse H. Rhodes adds to this literature with Ballot Blocked: The Political Erosion
of the Voting Rights Act.18 The book’s main thesis is that Republican officials “adopted a
sophisticated long-term strategy” of publicly supporting the Voting Rights Act while
surreptitiously attempting to weaken and undermine it. 19
Relying on extensive primary source research, the author argues that Republicans
repeatedly voted to adopt, reauthorize, and expand the Act over the course of several
decades because those actions received substantial public attention20 and they feared
political backlash if they appeared to oppose voting rights for minorities. 21 At the same
time, Republicans “craft[ed] esoteric administrative rules,” “exploit[ed] bureaucratic
procedures,” hired conservative attorneys in the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”)
Civil Rights Division, and nominated conservative Supreme Court Justices “to weaken the
act on their behalf.”22 Republicans relied on such techniques, the author maintains,
because bureaucratic decisions and judicial appointments generally do not receive the
same public attention and scrutiny as congressional debates over the Voting Rights Act. 23
Thus, Rhodes concludes, Republicans could disingenuously “limit federal voting rights
10. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 117–18 (2010).
11. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 12–13 (1968).
12. Daniel Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L.
REV. 689, 702 (2006).
13. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AN ASSESSMENT OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS ACCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2018 STATUTORY REPORT 200 (registration rates), 211 (turnout rates).
14. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter; The Death of a
Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1427 (2015).
15. Janai S. Nelson, Defining Race: The Obama Phenomenon and the Voting Rights Act, 72 ALB. L. REV.
899, 900–02 (2009).
16. See, e.g., ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN
AMERICA (2016); CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, ET AL., THE RISE AND FALL OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2016);
see also Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING:
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 7 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, eds. 1992); Michael J.
Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903 (2008).
17. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 211–16, 221–23, 226–46 (rev. ed. 2009).
18. See JESSE H. RHODES, BALLOT BLOCKED: THE POLITICAL EROSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2017).
19. Id. at 3, 18, 59, 95.
20. Id. at 16–17.
21. Id. at 14–15, 95.
22. Id. at 3.
23. RHODES, supra note 18, at 16–17, 107.
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enforcement . . . while simultaneously maintaining the electorally useful appearance of
fealty to the ideal of racial equality.” 24 Through this deceptive strategy, Republicans
“eroded the promise of American democracy by rendering the voting rights of people of
color and minority-language speakers more vulnerable.”25
The book presents a lively and interesting overview of the Voting Rights Act’s
history over the past half-century. In particular, it adds to the literature criticizing the Act’s
implementation under Republican administrations, particularly that of President George
W. Bush.26 I believe the author overstates his conclusions, however, and his evidence and
analysis fall short of establishing them. Nevertheless, this work highlights the important
issues that arise in attempting to implement a somewhat vague, politically charged,
expressly race-conscious law that regulates the electoral process and, by extension, the
allocation of political power in this country.
Part I of this Review explores the book’s pervasive tendency to present most
Republicans from across all branches of government throughout a period of over fifty
years as acting in an almost monolithic fashion to achieve their supposedly shared goal of
surreptitiously undermining the Voting Rights Act. Part II argues that important evidence
the book did not consider might lead to different conclusions. At a minimum, the record
could be read as showing that Republican administrations did not attempt to undermine
the Voting Rights Act, but rather interpreted and enforced it somewhat differently than
Democratic administrations—a common occurrence with many statutes. Ironically,
Republican interpretations sometimes led to broader enforcement of the Act. Additionally,
several of the considerations Rhodes cites as evidence of an alleged Republican strategy
to secretly erode the Act apply equally to Democratic administrations. Part III briefly
concludes.
I. ANOTHER “VAST RIGHT-WING CONSPIRACY”?
As noted above, the book centers around Rhodes’s argument that, from the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act through the present day, Republican officials across
all branches of government have “adopted a sophisticated long-term strategy” of
supporting the Act in public while simultaneously attempting to dismantle it through less
visible channels.27 The book appears to treat almost any action relating to the Act over
the course of the past half-century by any Republican—whether a Member of Congress,
Senator, President, Department of Justice official, or even Supreme Court Justice—as
furthering this plan. He implies that hundreds of Republicans across all branches of
government, including the judiciary, cooperated in some sense to allow the party to
publicly support the Voting Rights Act while working to undermine it just out of public

24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 3.
26. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Lessons Learned: Voting Rights and the Bush Administration, 4 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 27 (2009); Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 211 (2008); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESP., U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL
ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION (July 2, 2008).
27. RHODES, supra note 18, at 3, 18, 59, 95.
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view.28
The book’s empirical evidence does not support such sweeping conclusions, for
three main reasons. First, Rhodes’s evidence of Republican legislators’ subjective
intentions and goals is tenuous and speculative. Whenever most Republican legislators
voted in favor of the Voting Rights Act, Rhodes contends, it is because they were outfoxed
by the civil rights community and pressured or shamed into it.29 Whenever Republicans
voted to adopt or reauthorize the Act, Rhodes contends, they did so “grudgingly,” 30
“unenthusiastic[ally],”31 or despite “deplor[ing]” it.32 Yet the book offers very little
empirical evidence concerning the purported subjective intent, feelings, and motives of
hundreds of Republican legislators throughout several decades. Rhodes relies primarily
on the fact that, before voting to adopt the VRA or its reauthorizations, many of them—
like many Democrats—had voted in favor of alternatives33 or amendments that would
have narrowed the law in certain respects or, ironically, expanded its geographic
applicability.34
Legislators often have diverse motives for supporting or opposing legislative
amendments, however,35 particularly amendments they know will not pass. The fact that
they may have preferred a different version of a bill does not suggest hostility to the version
that was ultimately enacted. In any event, attempting to infer the intent of a large group
of legislators based on the legislation they enact is a precarious enough endeavor. 36 Going
even further by attempting to infer their supposed subjective preferences, motives, and
desires based on voting patterns concerning failed amendments merely exacerbates the
speculation.
Moreover, the book offers no evidence that Members of Congress or Senators
considered the possibility of Republican appointments to either DOJ or the Supreme Court
when deciding whether to adopt or reauthorize Act. In other words, there is no affirmative
evidence that any Members of Congress or Senators viewed their votes as merely the
public-facing part of a broader plan to ultimately undermine the very measures they were
approving. Indeed, the vast majority of people voting on the Act—Members of the U.S.
House of Representatives—were not even in a position to participate in the confirmation
processes concerning senior DOJ officials or Supreme Court Justices.
Second, Rhodes’s evidence that Republican Supreme Court Justices sought to aid
Republican elected officials in a strategy to surreptitiously undermine the Voting Rights
Act is even more tenuous. The central question his book presents is, “Why did key
28. Id. at 4 (describing the “partisan coalition” to use “administrative and judicial institutions . . . to advance
cherished but controversial programmatic objectives”); id. at 141 (discussing “[t]he stark divergence in behavior
between Republican elected officials acting in high-profile and politically open arenas and Republican political
and judicial appointees operating in more opaque and impermeable venues”).
29. See, e.g., id. at 95, 107, 131.
30. Id. at 16, 108; see also id. at 76.
31. Id. at 70.
32. RHODES, supra note 18, at 17.
33. Id. at 68.
34. Id. at 76, 103, 151.
35. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 4041 (1991).
36. See John Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 423, 438 (2005).
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conservative Republican officials consistently adopt administrative and judicial decisions
that undermined the very legislation they previously endorsed?”37 But Republican
legislators, of course, did not “adopt” any “judicial decisions.” And Supreme Court
Justices played no role in enacting or “endors[ing]” the Voting Rights Act. Rhodes
maintains that elected Republicans “deliberately and repeatedly invite[d] . . . [and]
empower[ed] unelected allies to weaken or overturn” the Act,38 “delegat[ing] to the Court
the task of terminating the [Act’s] preclearance regime.” 39 In Rhodes’s view, when
Republican Justices ruled in Voting Rights Act cases, they did so on “behalf” of the
Presidents who appointed them.40 Republican Justices may be surprised to learn they had
received any such delegations or assignments.
Similarly, the book contends that, by having the courts narrow and invalidate parts
of the Voting Rights Act, “Republican elected officials retained ‘plausible deniability’ of
responsibility.”41 What the book presents as plausible deniability is, from a constitutional
perspective, separation of powers.42 One of the Court’s main functions is to act as a check
on Congress, rather than acting consistently with Congress’ publicly declared positions. 43
Thus, Rhodes’s conceptions of the relationship between the legislative and judicial
branches, as well as the judiciary’s role with regard to the Voting Rights Act, are
misguided.
Third, Rhode suggests Republican Presidents selected Justices with an eye toward
their likely attitudes toward the Voting Rights Act. 44 But the book does not provide any
evidence that concerns about the Act led Republican Presidents or Senators to modify their
approach toward the judicial nomination process. To the contrary, since President
Reagan’s failed nomination of Judge Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 the nomination
process has focused primarily on judicial philosophy: whether nominees are textualists or
originalists and believe judges should attempt to neutrally “call balls and strikes,” 46 or
instead embrace a “living Constitution” and approach cases with “empathy” toward

37. RHODES, supra note 18, at 3.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 160; see also id. at 18 (arguing that Republican officials pursued their “narrow vision of federal
voting rights enforcement” in the “judicial arena”); id. at 131 (discussing Republicans’ “strategic delegation to
the Court of the unpopular business of weakening federal voting rights safeguards”).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 19.
42. Of course, some commentators have argued that the rise of political parties has dampened the willingness
of the various branches to actually check party members in other branches. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2317–19 (2009).
43. To the extent Congress disapproves of the Court’s rulings, it retains a wealth of powers with which to
respond. See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Non-Federal Federal
Question,
___
GEO.
MASON
L.
REV.
___,
at
17
n.124
(2019)
(forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946482 (identifying constitutional mechanisms for
congressional control over federal courts).
44. RHODES, supra note 18, at 3 (arguing Republican Presidents “empowered conservative justices . . . to
weaken the act on their behalf”); id. at 9 (contending Republicans “obstructed implementation of the VRA
through . . . the courts”); id. at 19 (alleging Republicans “exploited” the judicial nomination process “to
circumscribe federal voting rights enforcement”).
45. See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 267–345 (1990).
46. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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particular litigants.47 While judicial appointments undoubtedly had consequences for the
Act, there is little evidence they were viewed and treated as a component of a
comprehensive fifty-year-long Republican strategy to covertly undermine the Act while
publicly supporting it. It is also worth noting that, according to Rhodes’s data, three out
of President Richard Nixon’s four appointees to the Supreme Court voted for the
ostensibly “liberal” position in the majority of VRA cases they confronted. 48
In short, there are definitely stories to be told about the differing approaches the
Democrat and Republican parties have adopted toward the electoral process, the Voting
Rights Act, and judicial appointments. The conclusions that Rhodes seeks to draw,
however, far outstrip the underlying evidence. Despite Rhodes’s commendably extensive
primary source research, the book relies too much on speculation and overgeneralization
to draw unsupported connections.
II. REPUBLICANS, DEMOCRATS, AND THE VRA
Rhodes presents a narrative of Republicans attempting to undermine, weaken,
frustrate, and erode the Voting Rights Act over more than fifty years. 49 If the historical
record is viewed in greater context, however, a competing narrative—one familiar from
administrative law—may emerge. As with many broadly written laws, Democratic and
Republican administrations simply adopted different interpretations of the Act. In some
cases, Republican administrations construed it more broadly than their Democratic
counterparts.
Agencies such as DOJ “often exercise broad discretion with respect to enforcement
of the statutes and regulations they administer.”50 They “must be given ample latitude to
‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances.’” 51 Many of the
Voting Rights Act’s most important provisions are written in generalities, 52 and it is not
immediately apparent from their plain text exactly how they apply to situations that do not
involve intentional discrimination, particularly redistricting decisions in which an
effectively infinite number of outcomes are generally possible. DOJ often must weigh
numerous considerations that may sometimes be in tension with each other. Election laws
with disparate racial impacts raise serious questions under § 2,53 yet states must protect
the right to vote equally for all citizens,54 regardless of race, and racially proportional
representation is generally not required.55 One scholar explains, “The combination of the
change in the focus of the Voting Rights Act from official discriminatory policies to
47. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Justice David Souter (May 1, 2009), at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-justice-david-souter; see also Sonia
Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002).
48. RHODES, supra note 18, at 85.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 683 (2014).
51. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (quoting Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)).
52. See, e.g., VRA, supra note 1, §§ 2, 5, 79 Stat. at 437, 439.
53. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986).
54. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
55. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”).
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discriminatory results, coupled with the shift to a more polarized national political
environment created ‘enforcement space’ . . . . Each new administration is able to
determine the type of voting rights violations that will take priority.”56
DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General has concluded that, despite their differences,
both President George W. Bush’s and President Barack Obama’s Administrations
implemented the Voting Rights Act appropriately. It explained that, while “some changes
in enforcement priorities” accompanied changing administrations, “our review generally
did not substantiate the allegations we heard about partisan or racial motivations and did
not support a conclusion that the Voting Section has improperly favored or disfavored any
particular group of voters in the enforcement of the Voting Rights laws.” 57
At least three examples demonstrate how differences between Democrat and
Republican administrations cannot simply be reduced to questions of greater or lesser
enforcement of the Act. First, President George W. Bush’s Justice Department launched
United States v. Brown, the first-ever § 2 case against an African-American defendant for
discriminating against white voters.58 Its decision to pursue the suit triggered enormous
controversy. Many career attorneys within the Voting Section opposed the suit, primarily
on the grounds § 2 could not or should not be enforced against minority defendants. 59
In Brown, the DOJ sued the Noxubee County Democratic Executive Committee
(“Democratic Committee”); its chairman, Ike Brown, who was African-American; and the
county election commission for violating § 2.60 Noxubee County’s population was 70%
African-American; 93% of its elected officials, as well as the majority of the county’s
Democratic Party, were African-American, as well.61 The Democratic Committee was
almost exclusively responsible for running the party’s primary elections in Noxubee
County, and Brown exercised tremendous influence and control over the committee’s
operations.62
Following a bench trial featuring dozens of witnesses, the district court declared it
was “convinced that Ike Brown, and the [Democratic Committee] under his leadership,
have engaged in racially motivated manipulation of the electoral process in Noxubee
County to the detriment of white voters.” 63 It further explained, “[T]here is no doubt from
the evidence presented at trial that Brown, in particular, is firmly of the view that blacks,

56. Donald Campbell, Partisanship, Politics, and the Voting Rights Act: The Curious Case of U.S. v. Ike
Brown, 29 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 33, 58 (2013).
57. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE VOTING
SECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 113 (Mar. 2013).
58. See United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007) [hereinafter “Brown I”], aff’d 561
F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter “Brown II”].
59. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 57, at 44 (explaining that multiple staff attorneys in DOJ’s
Voting Section “did not believe the Voting Section should pursue cases on behalf of White victims”); see also
William R. Yeomans, The Politics of Civil Rights Enforcement, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 509, 532 (2014) (discussing
the “enormous tension” Brown generated within the Voting Section).
60. See Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440. The Government also sued Noxubee County and the county clerk for
violating § 11 of the VRA, but those defendants entered into a consent decree. Id. at 440 n.1. Section 11 makes
it a federal offense for any person acting under color of law to refuse to allow a qualified voter to cast a ballot or
to refrain from counting such votes. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(a).
61. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 443.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 449.
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being the majority race in Noxubee County, should hold all elected offices, to the exclusion
of whites; and this view is apparently shared by his ‘allies’ and ‘associates’ on the
[Democratic Committee], who, along with Brown, effectively control the election process
in Noxubee County.”64
The court determined that, as chairman of the county Democratic party, Brown
recruited African-Americans from outside the county to run against the few white county
officials.65 He then excluded the two white members of the Democratic Committee’s
executive committee from a hearing concerning the eligibility of one of those candidates.66
Prior to a 2003 election, Brown also issued a press release identifying 174 white voters
whom he intended to challenge at the polls.67 Most were constituents of the only white
member of the county commission.68 At trial, he could provide no evidence that most of
those people were ineligible to vote, or that he had performed any investigation into their
eligibility.69
The court further found that Brown and members of the Democratic Committee
“intentionally selected a nearly all-black work force primarily as a means of facilitating a
scheme to disenfranchise and dilute white voting strength by pushing through absentee
ballots that had been collected by Brown’s people.”70 As party chair, the court explained,
Brown hired and paid notaries to assist only black voters in completing and submitting
absentee ballots, including people ineligible to vote absentee under state law. In at least
one case, the notary actually completed the ballots, deciding the candidates for whom they
would be cast.71 Brown also oversaw the counting of absentee ballots, directing poll
workers to ignore statutory requirements and procedures. 72 The court found that he
instructed poll workers to disregard any challenges to absentee ballots and prohibited them
from rejecting absentee ballots from African-American voters that were invalid under state
law.73 At the same time, he ordered poll workers to reject some white voters’ absentee
ballots, despite allowing ballots with similar defects from African-Americans to be
counted.74
The incredulous district court declared, “While the Government’s theory in this
regard, that Brown and his ‘associates’ and ‘allies’ orchestrated such a scheme, may seem
improbable, having thoroughly reviewed and considered the evidence, the court has come
to the firm and definite conclusion that there is substance to the Government’s position.” 75
It concluded, “If the same facts were presented . . . on behalf of the rights of black voters,

64. Id.
65. Id. at 452–53; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 429–30.
66. Brown I, F. Supp. 2d at 454–55. Brown also admitted to making a false charge of racial discrimination
against a white county supervisor to try to get him voted out of office. Id. at 455; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 429.
67. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 474–77; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 429, 433–34.
68. Brown II, 561 F.3d at 429.
69. Id.
70. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 463; see also Brown II, 561 F.3d at 428, 433.
71. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 459–60; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 427–28.
72. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 464–65; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 428.
73. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 457, 461, 464–65.
74. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 469–70; Brown II, 561 F.3d at 428, 434–35.
75. Brown I, 494 F. Supp. 2d at 457.
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this court would find that Section 2 was violated.”76 The court refused to afford white
voters any less protection, despite defendants’ insistence that whites had neither
experienced an extensive history of racial discrimination nor faced ongoing discrimination
elsewhere in the state.77 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 78 and
commentators have since debated the case. 79
During the Obama Administration, Attorney General Eric Holder expressed
opposition to such “reverse-discrimination” suits, declaring that he did not wish “to expand
the use of the power of the Civil Rights Division in such a way that it would take us into
areas that, though justified, would come at . . . the cost of people [that the] Civil Rights
Division had traditionally protected.”80 Likewise, when Deputy Assistant Attorney
General Julie Fernandes was asked about the possibility of pursuing a Section 2 case
against a black defendant, she instructed Section attorneys that they “should focus on
‘traditional civil rights’ cases and . . . political equality for racial and ethnic minorities.”81
Consistent with these policies, the Obama Administration did not bring any lawsuits under
the Voting Rights Act against African-American defendants. To the contrary, shortly after
the transition, the Obama Administration dropped almost all claims in a lawsuit the Bush
Administration had already won (through default judgments) against the New Black
Panther Party for voter intimidation during the 2008 election.82
A second example of the parties’ differing interpretations of the Voting Rights Act
concerns the need for majority-minority districts under § 5 of the Act. The issue arose in
connection with Georgia’s 2001 redistricting plan for its state senate. The state’s previous
legislative map included ten districts with a voting-age population (“VAP”) that was more
than 50% black, as well as eight other districts with VAPs that were between 30-50%
black.83 The Georgia legislature, controlled by Democrats, sought to increase the number
of Democrat senators by spreading African-American voters among more districts.84 It
adopted a map including 13 districts with VAPs that were more than 50% black (an
increase of three), another 13 districts with VAPs that were 30-50% black (an increase of
five), and 4 other districts with VAPs that were between 25-50% black.85 Republicans in
the legislature unanimously opposed the plan and President George W. Bush’s Justice
76. Id. at 486.
77. Id.
78. Brown II, 561 F.3d at 438.
79. Compare Cody Gray, A New Proposal to Address Local Voting Discrimination, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 611,
640 n.169 (2016) (“[Brown] was certainly justifiable on a legal basis . . . .”); Denny Chen, Note, Section 2 of the
1965 Voting Rights Act and White Americans, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 453, 477 (2012) (“[C]ourts should interpret
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as applicable to any citizen; such an interpretation best effectuates the purpose
of the VRA—protecting the voting rights of all Americans.”); with Karlan, supra note 26, at 28 (citing Brown as
one of several factors demonstrating that “a politicized Department of Justice cannot perform its tasks fully and
fairly”); Campbell, supra note 56, at 66 (arguing the Brown case “demonstrates the unique problems that arise
when using the [VRA] . . . against African Americans”); Yeomans, supra note 59, at 532 n.168 (“[T]here remains
a question of whether § 2 can properly be applied in many instances to protect white voters.”).
80. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 57, at 52.
81. Id. at 75.
82. See Amanda C. Leiter, Soft Whistleblowing, 48 GA. L. REV. 425, 454–58 (2014); see also Gilda R.
Daniels, Voter Deception, 43 IND. L. REV. 343, 366–67 (2010).
83. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 470 (2003).
84. Id. at 469.
85. Id. at 470–71.
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Department refused to pre-clear it under Section 5 of the VRA.86
The Government argued, and the district court found, that the plan violated Section
5 because it reduced the black VAPs of three districts (Districts #2, 12, and 26) from
between 55.43% and 62.45% to slightly over 50%.87 These reductions in black voting
strength diminished the opportunity of black voters in those districts to elect candidates of
their choice.88 The Government and district court believed § 5’s anti-retrogression
principle prohibited the Government from jeopardizing those districts’ status as “safe”
majority-minority districts.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 5 does not require states to
maintain a consistent number of majority-minority districts.89 Rather, the Court held,
Section 5 leaves states free to choose between preserving majority-minority districts in
which minorities are able to elect the candidates of their choice, or instead establishing
districts with lower proportions of minority voters, who may either enter into coalitions to
elect the candidates of their choice or impact the political process in other ways. 90
Rhodes presents Georgia v. Ashcroft as yet further evidence of how conservative
Supreme Court Justices worked behind the scenes, away from public view, to undermine
the Voting Rights Act.91 He claims the Georgia majority watered down Section 5,
“demoting the ability of minority voters to elect a candidate of choice to only one of a
number of factors to be evaluated in determining whether a redistricting plan was
retrogressive.”92 The ruling, he argued, “made it more probable that minority voters . . .
would be subjected to the dilution of their voting power, at least as traditionally
understood.”93 It “furthered the conservative project . . . of limiting the potential of the
Act to protect majority-minority districting.”94
The book does not explain, however, that President George W. Bush’s Justice
Department objected to the redistricting scheme at issue in Georgia, effectively rejecting
the theory the Supreme Court ultimately adopted.95 It likewise does not mention the fact
that Georgia Democrats—including virtually all black members of the legislature—were
the ones who crafted the map the Court upheld.96 And some voting rights scholars, such
as Samuel Isaacharoff, have suggested the Georgia Court’s holding enhances the ability
of African-Americans voters to participate in coalition politics and expand their political
influence far beyond what an exclusive focus on majority-minority districts would allow.97
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id. at 472–73.
88. Georgia, 539 U.S. at 474.
89. Id. at 482–83.
90. Id.
91. RHODES, supra note 18, at 140.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 141.
94. Id.
95. See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 472.
96. Id. at 471.
97. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1710, 1731 (2004) (arguing that the traditional understanding of § 5 prior to Georgia could cause “mischief
. . . in stalling coalition politics” involving African-Americans); see also Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law
Now at War With Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1557–58 (2002);
Cameron, Epstein, & O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in
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Thus, while the book uses Georgia v. Ashcroft as evidence supporting its narrative, it
overlooks the many ways in which the case actually cuts against it.
Finally, Republican administrations enforced provisions of voting rights law that
Democratic Administrations allowed to languish. For example, the Bush Justice
Department brought several suits to enforce Section 8 of the National Voter Registration
Act (“NVRA”),98 which requires jurisdictions to update voter registration lists to eliminate
outdated records to reduce the possibility of mistake, double voting, or absentee ballot
fraud.99 Under the Obama Administration, in contrast, Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Fernandez announced to Voting Section staff attorneys she “‘did not care about’ or ‘was
not interested’ in pursuing Section 8 cases.”100
In many other respects, Democrat and Republican administrations’ records of
enforcing the Voting Rights Act are comparable. Republican President Nixon’s Attorney
General largely continued Democrat President Johnson’s enforcement policies.101 Rhodes
acknowledges that both Republican President Gerald Ford’s Attorney General, Edward H.
Levi, and President George H.W. Bush’s Attorney General, Richard Thornburgh, enforced
the Voting Rights Act vigorously. 102 With regard to Section 2, DOJ’s Office of Inspector
General found the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations’ records comparable:
[W]e found it significant that following the change in administrations in 2009, there was no
surge in new Section 2 cases as might be expected if valid cases had been suppressed or
discouraged in the prior administration. Indeed, the number of Section 2 enforcement actions
dwindled to just four matters from 2009 through 2012.103

Rhodes criticizes the low rate of Section 5 objections during George W. Bush’s
administration, claiming “key provisions of the Act went into administrative
hibernation.”104 Yet the first term of the Obama Administration (prior to Shelby
County)105 had the same rate.106 And the volume of voting rights litigation that Obama’s
DOJ pursued never exceeded that of the Bush Administration (and, indeed, was less than
during Bush’s first term). 107
The book sometimes seems to offer diametrically opposite assessments when
different administrations adopt substantially similar policies. For example, when the Bush
Administration pursued majority-minority districts, it was facilitating the election of white
Republicans in neighboring districts;108 when Assistant Attorney General Deval Patrick
did so in the Clinton Administration, he was making “voting rights enforcement a top
Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 806 (1996).
98. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4).
99. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 57, at 94.
100. Id. at 100.
101. RHODES, supra note 18, at 3.
102. Id. at 81–82, 111.
103. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 57, at 25.
104. RHODES, supra note 18, at 137.
105. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013) (invaliding § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which identified
the jurisdictions subject to preclearance requirements under § 5).
106. RHODES, supra note 18, at 169.
107. Id. (quoting Michael L. Selmi, The Obama Administration’s Civil Rights Record: The Difference an
Administration Makes, 2 J. L. & SOC. EQUALITY 108, 120 (2013)).
108. RHODES, supra note 18, at 112.
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priority,” with no assessment of potential political motivations or consequences. 109
Likewise, when Republican administrations—even apart from George W. Bush—sought
to hire conservative attorneys in the Voting Section who shared the administration’s view
of the Voting Rights Act, they were inappropriately politicizing the office. 110 Yet when
the Obama Administration hired almost exclusively from left-wing groups, it was
faithfully implementing the Act.111
III. CONCLUSION
The history of the Voting Rights Act—and federal election law more broadly—is
more complicated and nuanced than Rhodes’s central narrative suggests. Rather than
Republican administrations secretly trying to weaken and undermine the Act, there is
ample reason to conclude Democratic and Republican administrations both faithfully
enforced it, albeit according to their differing interpretations and priorities. These
differences sometimes lead to broader or more aggressive enforcement of various voting
rights provisions by Republican administrations.

109. Id. at 118.
110. See id. at 79, 108, 133–34.
111. Id. at 166–67.
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